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Living in the yellow zone: The political geography of intervention in Haiti

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A B S T R A C T

Every international intervention comes with its own security regulations, which contribute in turn to structure the political geography of the intervention, delimiting areas of interaction between interveners and local population and shaping the political economy of intervention. The securitization of the everyday in Haiti took the form of colour-coded security zones (green, yellow and red), with distinct security regulations for each. This article will analyse the specific everyday ramifications of the *security mapping* in Haiti, focusing particularly on the vast yellow zone that covers residential areas in Port-au-Prince and the downtown area in dire need of investment after the earthquake. Based on interviews conducted in Port-au-Prince in 2017 and 2018, the article will make three distinct arguments, underscoring the ramifications of *mapping* as a spatial practice of securitization. First, by channelling expatriates to specific locations in the capital, and by preventing them from occupying other zones in Port-au-Prince, the securitization practices contribute to the gentrification process around the Pétion-Ville area, contributing in their own way to the deep-rooted social segregation process in play in Port-au-Prince. Second, it will analyse how these logics of securitization are linked to an 'imagined geography' of the capital, where actual security risks matter less than logics of disassociation from areas perceived as having no interest for international actors. Finally, the article will look at how security mapping is reappropriated and resisted by local actors, displaying a mix of resilience and self-help strategies. This article makes a distinct contribution by linking critical cartography and international relations, especially the colour-coding and security mapping discussion with the securitization and intervention literature.

1. Introduction

Sarah Collinson and Mark Duffield's realisation five years ago that 'there has been surprisingly little research into how international actors are actually responding to the real or perceived security risks they face in these unstable environments' (2013: 1) is still very relevant today. This is particularly true regarding how international actors' practices of responding to security risks shape how space is experienced. Interventions in a (post-)conflict or (post-)disaster context are increasingly seen through a risk-assessment lens, where security zones are spatialized depending on perceived security or insecurity for international staff. In Haiti, security mapping has taken shape through colour coding – with green zones deemed 'safe', yellow zones 'risky' and red zones 'to avoid'. Colour coding in the context of security mapping is not new. The concept of 'red zone' – and its counterpart, the 'green zone' – was used to read the security situation in Iraq after the 2003 intervention (Vincent, 2004), and some authors date it back to the First World War (Tidball & Krasny, 2014, p. 7). Colour coding in the context of security mapping of international interventions can also be understood as an extension of social cartography, with early examples being Charles Booth's map of London, with each street coloured to indicate the income and social class of its inhabitants (with the lowest class deemed 'vicious, semi-criminal'),[1] or redlining maps or 'security maps', used by mortgage lenders in the United States in the New Deal era to assess risk for home loans insurance based on a colour chart (Nelson, 2018). More recently, colour coding has also been used in the context of numerous interventions, including in Kabul and Baghdad (the infamous 'green zone'), in Mogadishu (the 'white zone' seen as a secure zone for the government and the international community), in Juba and Nairobi (the 'blue zone' as a location approved by UN security authorities for international UN staff to reside), or in Bangui and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ('red zones' or areas of unrest), to list a few recent examples.

Security maps are an integral part of broader assemblages of logics of securitization, and the burgeoning literature on critical military geography has contributed to enquiring how militarization shapes social and geographical spaces (Higate & Henry, 2011; Rech et al., 2015; Woodward, 2004, 2005). However, so far, most of the work on the topic has followed the premises of 'traditional military geography' and more often than not has fallen into the 'institutional' category of political geography of peacekeeping, especially with a focus on 'buffer zones', 'security corridors', and 'security zones' (see, for instance, Grundy-Warr, 1994) – reminding us of the infamous United Nations safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina or, more recently, the 'safe zones' in Sri Lanka. Critical cartography – the analysis of how power works through maps, informing how they are made, read and otherwise used – has not made serious advances in the field of peacebuilding and

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[1] See: https://booth.lse.ac.uk/.

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international interventions.[2] This contribution intends to adopt such an approach on the practical politics of mapping and maps (Herb et al., 2009, p. 335) by focusing on *mapping* (Kitchin & Dodge, 2007) as a spatial practice of securitization. Mapping not only represents reality, but also has an active role in the social construction of that reality (Dodge, Kitchin, & Perkins, 2011: xx). This article inquires the 'tactical form of knowledge' (Dalby, 2010, p. 280) behind the mapping of security zones of Port-au-Prince, demonstrating how this situated knowledge cannot be dissociated from the social imaginary informing the intervention in the first place. Furthermore, I will be analysing the security map as a set of knowledge in a 'state of becoming' (Kitchin & Dodge, 2007, p. 335), constantly reaffirmed and remade, but also reappropriated and contested, by actors on the receiving end of the securitization practices.

A few other caveats regarding the positioning of this article vis-à-vis the existing literature are also in order. The article will partly focus on hotels in the yellow zone; thus, in addition to the critical cartography literature already mentioned, this article is also in conversation with a literature looking at how hotels become geopolitical sites, connected to and embedded in broader geopolitical architectures and geographies of security and insecurity (Fregonese & Ramadan, 2015; Lisle, 2013; Smirl, 2015, 2016; for a particular focus on the Oloffson Hotel in Haiti, see; Pettinger, 2013). This article adopts a slightly different approach to the topic; it does not treat hotels as material infrastructure transformed into 'secure' enclaves (Lisle, 2013), or focus on them as spaces of interactions, liminality or mediation (Craggs, 2012; Fregonese & Ramadan, 2015; Smirl, 2016), but aims rather to highlight the effects of securitization practices on hotels located in areas deemed insecure by producers of (in)security, as well as highlighting the diversity of practices displayed by hotel owners and other individuals located in the 'yellow zone' through an everyday security perspective. In so doing, the article aims to bring closer together accounts of the critical approach to intervention and statebuilding on the 'everyday turn', spaces and landscape (Autesserre, 2014; Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017; Duffield, 2010; Jennings & Bøås, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2017; Pouligny, 2006; Vogel, 2018) with the literature on (in)securitization practices.

Finally, this article further positions itself within the broad field of securitization, understanding the concept not so much as the speech acts of the security experts and the discursive practices of the professionals of insecurity (Huysmans, 2011; Wæver, 1995) as the ramifications of the everyday practices of security and insecurity (Balzacq et al., 2010). Hence, the article aims to understand why and how securitization happens, as well as the effects that this process has on the life and the politics of a community (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka, 2016: 495). In addition, this article adopts an 'everyday security' lens, or how 'practices of security governance are experienced by different people and groups "on the ground" so to speak, and how they are implicated in, forged through and find expression via quotidian aspects of social life' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1185). The article focuses more on the 'lived experiences of security processes' – security measures in practice exemplified by the cartography of security zones and its effects – than on the 'vernacular turn' of security (Vaughan-Williams & Stevens, 2016).[3] As Jef Huysmans argues, security practices often contain particular notions of everyday life, acting both as justification for policies – in our case, the specific 'security project' implemented by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – and as a security instrument – the security map regulating the everyday of UN expats (Huysmans, 2009, p. 197). Consequently, I hope this article will make a specific contribution to the development of a distinct *political geography of securitization* (Bernazzoli & Flint, 2009), but also to the burgeoning sub-discipline of *urban geopolitics* (Graham, 2004; Rokem et al., 2017), and especially *everyday urban geopolitics* (Fregonese, 2012: 295–296).

This article draws on rich empirical material gathered through three main fieldwork visits, made in March 2017, June 2017 and March 2018, in Port-au-Prince, where I interviewed officials from MINUSTAH, officials from the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH),[4] local business owners (hotel owners) living in the 'yellow zone' or being subject to similar regulations, and local activists in the 'red zone' wishing to change the security regulations in their neighbourhood. Most interviews were conducted in French, and excerpts used in the article have been translated into English by the author. The hotel owners interviewed constitute a representative sample of the hotels not authorized by the UN, with the Oloffson Hotel, Prince Hotel and Le Plaza Hotel catering for international guests, Le Marcelin Inn with 10–20% international clientele (mostly backpackers), and a hotel like the Fanm Vanyan Inn, which caters mostly for local guests and the diaspora (mostly Haitian-Americans or Haitian-Canadians visiting family in Port-au-Prince, acting as an overflow hotel for Le Marcelin Inn). The research also draws on past fieldwork material, dating back to 2011, as well as additional email and Skype interviews with contacts living in Haiti during the writing phase of this article.

In many respects, this article started off as a journey in the Oloffson Hotel, where I stayed multiple times over the years. The article uses many tweets and other material posted online by his 'idiosyncratic owner' (Pettinger, 2013, p. 183), Richard A. Morse, a Haitian-American, cousin of former President Michel Martelly, with a degree in anthropology from Princeton and whose 'political edge has sometimes landed him in trouble with the authorities'. In recent years, he led a very public charge against the security mapping of Port-au-Prince – by the UN but also by the American Embassy. The Oloffson is located at a crossroad between two very distinct areas: Pacot, a relatively affluent area, and Carrefour Feuilles, an area considered 'problematic' despite a general improvement of the security situation in this area, and as such has been subject to security regulations. Even if it is not formally inside the UN yellow zone (like Hotel Prince), it is generally not included in the list of authorized hotels in Port-au-Prince for expatriates.[5] His public vendetta against 'security entrepreneurs' in the country helped raised local and international awareness of the issues pertaining to security mapping in the capital.

Hence, the aim of the article is to investigate the politics of *security mapping* and the ramifications of these security practices for local actors living in these security zones. As such, the research addresses two specific questions: (1) what logics of securitization does *security mapping* serve? and (2) how do these securitization policies impact and shape statebuilding processes in Haiti? In response to the first research question, I argue that these securitization practices are driven by two main factors. First, MINUSTAH linked them to the imagined geography of Port-au-Prince – specifying the ways 'the world is' and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world in its image (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007, p. 411; see also; Gregory, 1995; Graham, 2006). This imagined geography is driven by an 'empty-shell approach' (Lemay-Hébert, 2011b), where in most of the city there is simply nothing of interest for

[2] An exception is Jordan Branch's work (2014), analysing how mapping technology (as a set of material tools and practices) has been connected with the early modern transformation of the state.

[3] For a good overview of security experiences in Haiti following the 'vernacular turn', see Higate & Henry, 2009.

[4] MINUSTAH has been active for 13 years, with the mission withdrawn in April 2017 and a smaller mission, MINUJUSTH, established.

[5] To see which hotels are included in this list, see for instance: http://dlca.logcluster.org/download/attachments/853294/Haiti%20WFP%20approved%20hotels%20October2011.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1379357731000&api=v2. For an example of the impact of the list on tourism, see the discussion on the *Lonely Planet*'s forum on "UN approved Hotels": https://www.lonelyplanet.com/thorntree/forums/americas-caribbean/haiti/un-approved-hotels-in-port-au-prince.

the UN. Second, it is driven by logics of bunkerization that are increasingly constitutive elements of peacebuilding and statebuilding practices (Andersson & Weigand, 2015; Duffield, 2010; Fisher, 2017). In response to the second question, I will discuss how these practices fall within the wider political geography of statebuilding processes in Haiti, marked by a social segregation in different areas of the city. Thus, security practices contribute to shaping statebuilding processes through logics of inclusion and exclusion, contributing to broader dynamics of the political economy of interventions.

The article is divided into five sections. The first analyses the contested views on the perception of insecurity in Haiti and how a specific reading of the risk assessment on the ground has enabled the UN mission to develop its own securitizing logics. The second section develops the specific security-mapping practices of MINUSTAH, and how security regulations structure the everyday logics of the intervention. The third section looks at how the political geography of the intervention is connected with the deeper dynamics of socio-political segregation in play in the political geography of the city – which are as old as the country's independence – marked by a stark contrast between areas of 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The fourth section discusses the 'imagined geography' of interveners. Finally, drawing from interview material from activists in the so-called 'red zone', the article analyses the various strategies deployed by local actors in the face of the securitization move, marked by 'self-help', resilience-building and outright resistance to these securitization strategies.

2. Creating a narrative of insecurity, securitizing the country

Most contemporary UN peacekeeping missions have displayed a securitization discourse to various degrees, justifying their presence and use of force to meet local threats, stigmatizing local actors deemed 'problematic' and reading local politics through their own security lens. As such, MINUSTAH is hardly unique. However, it is the first 'stabilization' mission to be labelled as such by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[6] Stabilization activities are an integral part of the renewal of international interventions after a period of 'broken promises' in the early 1990s, and they are co-constitutive of a reliance on the use of force by international actors such as the United Nations to accomplish the mandate of the missions. One can even argue that stabilization's contemporary focus and agenda evolved from the shared experience of France, the UK and the USA in Afghanistan and in Iraq in the 2000s, with the doctrines and policies around stabilization missions developed by these countries in these contexts later permeating the work of the UN in operations in Haiti and elsewhere (de Coning 2018). Haiti also represents a microcosm of the doctrinal evolution of peacekeeping over the years. MINUSTAH is the latest of seven UN missions in the country – stretching over 20 years of international involvement in Haiti – and differs from preceding UN missions in Haiti through its greater emphasis on security (Lemay-Hébert, 2015, p. 722).

MINUSTAH was established in April 2004 and deployed in June that year to facilitate the transition between a fleeing Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had lost the loyalty of some of his supporters and found himself increasingly isolated, and a 'government of technocrats' headed by Gérard Latortue to lead the transition to elections in 2006. The main objective of MINUSTAH was to facilitate the transition between Aristide and a government to be elected, and to re-establish stability in the country. This emphasis on security was exemplified by the contributing countries' lasting commitment in terms of troops and police since the establishment of the mission (75% of the authorized personnel in 2016–17, representing roughly 50% of the budget before inclusion of infrastructure expenses).[7] MINUSTAH's security mandate has taken the hybrid shape of support for the security sector reform process and direct engagement in the 'stabilization' of the country. Both approaches to 'stabilization' (direct and indirect) have to be understood in connection with the wider statebuilding process in Haiti, where the state – at least the Western image of it – has never existed, at least not as a coherent idea binding citizens together and reflecting a Rousseauian social contract (Lemay-Hébert, 2014). It has consistently been a platform for competing factions, vying for positions of power. In that context, the joint approach of the Latortue government and MINUSTAH, which would set the tone for the post-Aristide statebuilding process, was to use a military solution to what is fundamentally a social problem, anchored in profound social, economic and cultural inequalities (Dupuy, 2007, pp. 179–180; Schuberth, 2017). MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police proceeded to 'clean up' the 'difficult' urban areas of Cité Soleil (or *Cite Soley* in Haitian Creole) and Bel Air (see Fig. 2 for the location of most neighbourhoods in the wider Port-au-Prince area).[8] The securitizing move behind this approach was quite simply to equate all *Chimères* or 'armed gangs' with '*Lavalas Chimères*' (linking them with the Aristide movement), and then these *Chimères* with bandits (Dupuy, 2007, p. 182; Fatton, 2007, p. 212; Muggah, 2010). Once labelled as bandits, it was possible to properly 'stabilize' or 'securitize' the area, and consequently the whole population living in 'difficult neighbourhoods' came to be defined as a security issue in a traditional securitization move (Huysmans, 2006; Noxolo & Huysmans, 2009, p. 2).

The reality is that the fight against violence and insecurity in Haiti has provided a very shaky foundation for the long-lasting presence of the peace mission. In fact, in 2010 the homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000 inhabitants compared favourably with the rate in the Dominican Republic (25 per 100,000), Trinidad and Tobago (26.1) and Jamaica (41.2) (Mobekk, 2017, p. 43). The most recent figure available (2016) is 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, again comparing favourably to other countries in the region. In addition, Haiti has been ranked the fourth most peaceful country out of 12 in Central America and the Caribbean by the Global Peace Index (Institute for Peace and Economics, 2017, p. 18). This leads the criminologist Arnaud Dandoy to argue that

> [w]aves of criminality in Haiti are often more imagined than real. If one takes the trouble to read the statistics for what they really say, one would realize that, in reality, little is known about crime in Haiti. The systematic application of strict security regulations therefore reflects the security ideology that prevails within the humanitarian community rather than a contextualized analysis of the security situation in the country. (Dandoy, 2013: 6; author's translation)

However, behind this lies conflicting security assessments by policymakers themselves. As the Chief Security Adviser of the current UN mission explained to me in an interview, there is a distinction between two schools of thought on the subject: one that tends to play down positive reports of the security situation by arguing that 'undercurrents' are unreported and that one should not trust the security data, and another noting that 'nothing is happening here' and that security incidents should not be blown out of proportion.[9] Representing the first school of thought, the US State Department Bureau of Diplomatic

[6] Followed by the Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014.

[7] Data available at www.un.org.en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml#MINUST.

[8] 'Operation Baghdad' was the name given by the interim government to the ghetto uprising in an attempt to label the people fighting as terrorists. However, the term was later adopted by the demonstrators themselves (Lunde, 2012, pp. 16–17).

[9] Interview with Emmanuel Monjimbo, Chief Security Adviser, UN Department of Safety and Security, MINUJUSTH, Delta Camp, 19 March 2018.

Security's Overseas Security Advisory Council argues that 'reports indicating that Haiti is statistically safer than other countries in the Caribbean are inaccurate'.[10] Representing the second school, a former UN spokesman, John Holmes, recognized a few months after the earthquake that 'it's very easy to convey the impression by focusing on a particular incident that there's a major security law and order problem arising in our view, [but] it is not the case' (Landers, Millar, & McMurtrie, 2010; the position was reiterated by the UNPOL spokesperson in 2012: see Dandoy, 2013, pp. 16–17). This reflects the view from national staff across different missions that international staff tend to overestimate the risk in relation to local security conditions (Egeland, Harmer, & Stoddard, 2011, p. 41). In general, this discussion provides a good example of how the 'definition of insecurities and the nature and limits of securitizing' (Noxolo & Huysmans, 2009, p. 2) are 'negotiated' and interpreted by different actors in Haiti.

3. Security mapping: securitization in practice

Through its work in Haiti, MINUSTAH has developed specific security-mapping practices for Port-au-Prince (see Fig. 1). The security zones in this map are tied to security procedure, with every zone – yellow or red – having specific security regulations attached to it.

Procedures in the *yellow zone* include a warning that 'staff members are strongly advised to exercise extreme caution and remain vigilant when traveling to or through the yellow zone'. When 'proceeding or transiting the yellow zone', security measures include the requirement to carry fully charged and ready-to-use radios and a clearance from the base, to be accompanied by at least one colleague, and to be out of the zone before 17.00 h.[11] After that time, the yellow zones become *red zones*, which have stricter security procedures, in particular requiring a military or Formed Police Unit escort for all travel within them. These are UN regulations, and it is worth noting that different international actors may use slightly different security maps. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office advises 'against all but essential travel to the Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Martissant and Bel Air neighbourhoods',[12] an assessment shared by Global Affairs Canada.[13] France lists the same neighbourhoods as areas that one 'should avoid', adding Jean-Marie Vincent to the list as well as 'popular neighbourhoods and slums' and areas 'near the port and airport'.[14]

The UN yellow zone as seen in Fig. 1 covers a huge portion of the commune of Port-au-Prince. The *arrondissement* of Port-au-Prince is constituted of eight communes: Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité Soleil, Tabarre, Carrefour, Pétion-Ville, Kenscoff, and Gressier. The arrondissement of Port-au-Prince is the largest in Haiti, with 2,759,991 inhabitants in 2015 (out of a total national population of 10,911,819), with the *commune* of Port-au-Prince numbering 987,310 inhabitants (IHSI, 2015, pp. 21–23). The commune is in turn divided into 35 neighbourhoods (see Fig. 2), and the yellow zone cuts through a number of these. The yellow zone comprises some of the most densely populated areas of the city, and includes the historic city centre (*centre-ville*) of Port-au-Prince.

Due to the loss of institutional memory – an acute problem in peacekeeping operations with frequent staff turnovers (Curran, 2015; UN, 2012, pp. 152–153) – compounded by the fact that the UN lost 102 members of its personnel during the 2010 earthquake when the MINUSTAH headquarters was levelled – it is difficult, if not nearly impossible, to adopt a historical approach to the evolution of security mapping in Haiti. Interviewees I met in 2017 did not recall who first adopted the security colour coding, and did not have – or did not want me to access[15] – previous maps. However, in 2017 the MINUSTAH chief of security offered the explanation that security zones were invented in 2004 from scratch.[16] According to him, other peace missions adopted security colour coding around that time, but the system is gradually being dropped because of a lack of standardized practice. Nevertheless, and to give an idea of the situation immediately after the 2010 earthquake, one of the first security maps posted online (on flickr.com, see Fig. 3) showed a slightly different risk assessment to 2017. For instance, the red zones are wider, but there is a similarly large 'yellow zone' covering a similar territory than the 2017 map depicted in Fig. 1, with a different tone of yellow for what appear to be slightly riskier zones. It is possible that these areas were classified as 'orange' at that time.[17]

To a certain extent, focusing on the evolution of the security map colour coding misses the bigger point, as discussed previously in the introduction. The focus of this research is not so much on the *map* as an object – a stable product – as on the politics of security *mapping* (Kitchin & Dodge, 2007) and its implications. The reality, and this is worth emphasising, is that all areas of Port-au-Prince are considered risky. This is clearly put forward in a confidential report produced for MINUSTAH, which states that 'every region in Port-au-Prince, at varying degrees, is at risk' (HaitiObservateur, 2006: 2). This is what appears particularly important to analyse, especially through the concept of 'yellow zone'. Cutting-edge research has been conducted on 'red zones' in Haiti, and particularly in Cité Soleil, which we will draw from and expand to cover the sprawling yellow zone. Higate and Henry, for instance, have brilliantly analysed the process of 'pseudo-quarantine' of the communities in these areas (2009: 60) and how the 'red zone' label renders these spaces 'invisible' and thus unintelligible (2013: 140), while at the same time capturing little of the vibrancy of local communities, but also how the label produces insecurity and legitimizes militarized social practices from intervenors (2009: 64–65). However, beyond the 'red zone' areas, little work has been done on the concept of 'yellow zone', and how (in)security practices by the UN impact everyday life in these areas.

4. The two worlds that make up Haiti

As discussed earlier, it is misleading (and ultimately 'Orientalizing') to approach Haitian politics through the prism of Western social contract theories. Haitian politics have been marked by a zero-sum game orchestrated by 'predatory elites' (Maguire, 1995), resting on stark

[10] See https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21726 (updated 26 April 2017).

[11] United Nations, "Security Advisory" (internal document, on file with author).

[12] UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Foreign Travel Advice Haiti", available at: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/haiti (last accessed 20 March 2017).

[13] Global Affairs Canada, "Haiti", available at: https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/haiti?_ga=1.50296928.719478103.1490024707 (last accessed 20 March 2017).

[14] France Diplomatie, "Haiti", available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs/conseils-par-pays/haiti/(last accessed 20 March 2017). Other 'security assessments' include UNICEF's, which defines the 'green zone' as covering the eastern part of the city (including the airport, Pétion-Ville and Tabarre), the 'yellow zone' as covering the western part of the city, and 'red zones' including Belair and Boston. See: https://www.unicef.org/haiti/french/FR_UNICEF_Haiti_-_Rapport_des_Six_Mois.pdf: 31.

[15] This is a typical problem for critical military geographies. As Rachel Woodward explains, 'information is often not available because it just has not been collected, or is not available in forms that have any real utility for social scientific research. Data is often withheld, judged secret in the interests of national security' (2005: 730).

[16] Interview with Banding Drame, chief of security, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 13 March 2017.

[17] As one aid worker recalled in 2010: 'One friend showed me the map, used by all of the larger NGOs where Port au Prince is divided into security zones, yellow, orange, red. Red zones are restricted, in the orange zones all of the car windows must be rolled up and they cannot be visited past certain times of day, even in the yellow zones aid workers are often not permitted to walk through the streets and spend much of their time in Haiti riding through the city from one office to another in organizational vehicles' (Kramer, 2010).



Fig. 1. Red and yellow zones, Port-au-Prince, March 2017. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Source: map on file with the author

social divisions between Haiti's impoverished majority (*pèp la* in Haitian Creole) and the wealthy few.[18] This social division has also shaped the political geography of Haiti and its capital city. For a long time, peasants had to have their activity shown in their passports, labelling them as '*moun andeyo*' (outsiders) who are not part of the nation and are excluded from its benefits and recognition (Barthélémy, 1989). Haiti still hosts two disparate societies in an unofficial apartheid (Bell, 2013, p. 30). The geography of Port-au-Prince also reflects this sharp social division. Port-au-Prince has been through a progressive process of 'popularisation of certain neighbourhoods' (Schuller, 2016, p. 35), especially the 'lower' neighbourhoods – signifying a proximity to sea level but also socioeconomic status – while, at the same time, the elite has occupied the 'higher' locations, especially around Pétion-Ville. There is a Haitian (or Port-au-Prince) saying that '*l'argent reste dans les hauteurs, il ne descend pas*' – 'the money remains up above, it does not come down'. Haiti can hence be seen as a 'constant crisis between two worlds: Pétion-Ville and Port-au-Prince'.[19]

For most expats, this entails in practice embracing the local bourgeoisie as well as a withdrawal from everyday engagement with populations in the yellow or red zones, a withdrawal combined with a concurrent securitization of these spaces by military actors. Most areas of Port-au-Prince, including the whole downtown area, are considered part of this yellow zone, where exercising caution is mandatory. Security regulations enforced by the UN and other international agencies have profound effects on the architecture of the city, reinforcing the existing social segregation and helping to empty the securitized areas of any public utility operations. These zones become transit spaces, where locals live but are not acknowledged.

Conversely, the other zones – 'green' or simply without a colour code indicating caution – become beacons to the international community, leading to a concentration of international actors there and the reshaping of the socioeconomic fabric of these areas. In contrast with the literature on 'bunkerization', 'green zones' are not simply 'entirely inaccessible to locals and detached from the local social context', as discussed by Collinson and Duffield (2013: 7). The green zones are, at least in Haiti, distinctively rooted and embedded in local power structures. They are not remote and detached – on the contrary, they are an integral part of the political geography of segregation between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', rooted in the long colonial and post-colonial history of the island. Similarly, the side-effects of securitizing practices do not simply affect the 'internationals' but also the local power

[18] This is not an analysis that is simply shared by critical, neo-Marxist scholars. In the words of the World Bank, 'Although it remains limited to date, available information on private enterprises suggests that the large families that dominated the Haitian economy during the Duvalier era during the 1970s and 1980s still retain control of large parts of the national economy, leading to a strong concentration of power in a number of key industries' (World Bank, 2016, p. 2; author's translation). For Arnaud Robert, the '*bourgeois*' are the '3% of the wealthy who manage 80% of the country's economy' (2012; author's translation).

[19] Interview with Marc Fred Pierre-Louis, General Manager of Le Plaza Hotel, 14 March 2017, Port-au-Prince.



Fig. 2. Districts of port-au-prince (in French).
Source: UN Habitat and Port-au-Prince City Council, "The 35 Districts of Port-au-Prince", available at: https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/P-codes%20Port-au-Prince%20Map%20grands%20quartiers%20110828.pdf



Fig. 3. Red, yellow and green zones on security map of Port-au-Prince, March 2010. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
Source: Ansel Herz, flickr account, available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mediahacker/4425181780

structures embedded in the security mapping process: 'they feel besieged. The mountains where they live are gradually nibbled at by fellow citizens who track their crumbs' (Woods & Robert, 2013, p. 64; author's translation).

In that context, MINUSTAH's securitization practices have not only helped to shape this specific socio-political geography through its security zones, but also were seen as revealing its own political hand to the Haitians. For one of our interviewees, 'the UN is part of the Pétion-Ville social class [*classe de Pétion-Ville*]. It protects people from Pétion-Ville, people with means'.[20] That led Timothy Schwartz to say that 'the

[20] Interview with Jean Presnet, Manager, Le Marcelin Inn, Port-au-Prince, 17 March 2017.

green zones were aptly named: they were places where the people the poor call the *boujwa* [bourgeoisie] made new fortunes, or added to old ones' (Schwartz, 2017). This is echoed by Richard Morse, owner of the Oloffson Hotel:

> Eventually I realized that the RED ZONE concept had morphed into another reality. RED ZONE now began to mean; "we don't want you to spend money there". "We don't want you hanging out there." "Thats [*sic*] a poor or middle class area and we don't want you or us to be seen there." "We want you to go spend your money in the GREEN ZONE." "We want you to go to these specific hotels, these restaurants and this part of town." (Morse, 2010; emphasis original)

Hence, the socio-political geography of securitization practices helped to fuel an economic bubble in Pétion-Ville, and concomitant logics of rentierism (Lemay-Hébert, 2011a). In recent years, Pétion-Ville has evolved from a municipality with a residential character to be the economic hub of the largest metropolitan area in the country – so much so that, in the words of Jerry Tardieu, the member of parliament for Pétion-Ville, the district can now be called the 'economic, tourism, commercial and cultural lung of the Haitian capital' (Tardieu, 2017). In this neighbourhood, the rent of houses once available for US$2000 or $3000 a month rose to between $7000 and $10,000 a month after the January 2010 earthquake (Redon, 2004, p. 304).

5. Bunkerization, 'imagined geography', and the shifting perceptions of risk

The security logics at play may be linked to an aim to 'depoliticize' security politics; at least, the insistence of MINUSTAH's chief of security that 'there is nothing political in the risk assessment'[21] seems to give credence to that interpretation (see also Dandoy, 2013, p. 9). However, there is also a logic of bunkerization and of *securitization of the self* at work (Lemay-Hébert, 2019), where these rather arbitrary spatial categorizations are primarily meant for international consumption. In fact, securitization practices are as driven by risk-aversion logics and logics of insurance[22] as they are about logics of dissociation. As the MINUSTAH chief of security put it to me, 'if we don't have people there, then we don't have to security manage it'.[23] Hence, embodying the neat logic of exclusion, he argues that 'regulations are for us, not for "them"'.[24] As one of his colleagues added, 'this is for internal purposes'.[25] Interestingly, this interpretation is shared by a hotel manager in the downtown area: 'there is nothing for them here'. However, he adds that it is a 'Catch-22 situation. They can't stop here because it is a yellow zone.'[26]

In addition, these securitization practices are driven by a specific reading of security on the ground. As one of my interviewees put it, the security zones 'made sense at the time; they don't any more'.[27] There was a geography of resistance in Haitian politics around 2004, when demonstrators came from the Bel Air and Saint-Martin districts to go to the Champs de Mars to demonstrate in front of the physical representation of the institutions of power, such as the presidential palace. The earthquake changed the political landscape, with demonstrations increasingly happening in Pétion-Ville,[28] around the Karibe Hotel or Place Saint-Pierre, which meant that 'crime is there now!' It felt 'safer here than in Pétion-Ville. People get mugged there, problems are there, not here [downtown]'.[29] According to the owner of another business located in the downtown area, 'Pétion-Ville should be the yellow zone, not here!'[30] This is a reality recognized by the district's congressman, Jerry Tardieu, noting the rampant insecurity in Pétion-Ville, characterized by a wave of attacks against a 'specific clientele' (Daniel Sénat, 2017). Hence, if for a MINUSTAH spokesperson, 'green (covering Petionville only) indicates residential areas with no history of insecurity',[31] this interpretation is challenged by the reality on the ground.

This leads some to say that 'the insecurity [in the yellow zone] is a creation of the internationals'.[32] In the words of one of Arnaud Dandoy's interviewees, an expat describing the process of listing what areas are dangerous,

> when many NGOs arrived in 2010, they probably said 'Cité Soleil is dangerous', 'Martissant is dangerous', 'Carrefour is dangerous'. Bam, bam, bam – red zone. For us, that's our three red zones. When I arrived, I said, 'All right, these are dangerous areas, we will not go there'. But, between you and me, there are places in Pétion-Ville that are more dangerous than places in Cité Soleil … (Dandoy, 2013: 39; author's translation).[33]

To give an indication of where the actual security incidents take place, an overview of security incidents specifically involving UN personnel highlights the fact that 'insecure' areas are where international are active (Tabarre for instance). MINUJUSTH officials gave me access to UN's log of security incidents covering the period 1 October–31 December 2017. Over this three-month period, 18 incidents involving United Nations personnel were reported: eight criminal incidents (three armed robberies; three instances of robbery, theft or attempted robbery; one theft of a UN vehicle; and one attempted break-in at the UN compound); seven incidents of civil unrest including damage to UN vehicles; and three road traffic accidents involving the UN. Of all these events, only three occurred in 'yellow zone' areas: one incident of civil unrest in front of the Faculty of Ethnology of the State University of Haiti; one incident of civil unrest in Grand Ravine; and one armed robbery in Solino 24. By comparison, five incidents occurred outside Port-au-Prince, five in the Tabarre area (where the UN compound and several embassies are located), two on Delmas Road, one of the city's major arteries, and one in the wider Pétion-Ville area. When asked for any further evidence, UN security personnel revealed that, for the

[21] Interview with Drame.

[22] As one travel memoir highlights (through an interview with a UNICEF worker in Haiti), the security constraints are dictated more by UNICEF's insurers than by a rational risk-benefit analysis (Evans, 2015, p. 132).

[23] Interview with Drame.

[24] Evans, 2015.

[25] Interview with Mr. Gonzalez, Deputy Chief Security Officer in charge of operations, MINUSTAH, 7 June 2017, Port-au-Prince.

[26] Interview with Pierre-Louis. A further reason given to explain the lack of development of the downtown area is the government decision on 2 September 2010 to make a huge part of the area a 'public utility' zone, *de facto* expropriating the landowners in the area. On 25 May 2012, the Martelly government indicated that the area would be turned into an 'administrative estate' [*cité administrative*], but it has not further clarified its vision for the area. On 30 June 2017, the Jovenel government expanded the public utility zone for the reconstruction of public buildings.

[27] Interview with Pierre-Louis.

[28] An analysis of the security briefs issued by the US Embassy and by the private security company Garda highlights the many protests in Pétion-Ville, with demonstrations occurring on 14 July, 25 July, 30 September, and 24 October 2017.

[29] Interview with Pierre-Louis. This analysis is corroborated by the British government's travel advice, which notes that 'there has been an increase in violent muggings, some of which have resulted in fatalities, in areas popular with foreign residents, such as Petionville'. See: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/haiti/safety-and-security.

[30] Interview with Presnet.

[31] MINUSTAH spokesperson, quoted by Ansel Heck, available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/mediahacker/4425181780.

[32] Interview with Plaisimond Choute Rosalie, owner and manager, Fanm Vanyan Inn, 17 March 2017, Port-au-Prince.

[33] This opinion is shared by another expatriate, interviewed by Arnaud Dandoy: 'Petion Ville remains a green zone for us, although this does not mean that Petion Ville is safer than the other places; quite the contrary, with the concentration of all the activities in Petion Ville' (2013: 44; author's translation).

Fig. 4. Security zones as areas of insecurity.
Source: UNDSS, Haiti Security Orientation Briefing, May 2014. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/Security%20Orientation%20Briefing_SOB_as%20of%202014_05.pdf

period 19 February to 18 March 2018, four major incidents of armed robbery were reported, and again these happened outside the security zones. One armed robbery took place in front of the security compound (Delta Camp, in the Tabarre area), one attempted robbery in the Vivy Mitchell area, and two armed robberies at the international airport (Tabarre area). More recently, there were widespread popular demonstrations on the 6th and 7th of July 2018, which began after the Commerce Ministry and Economic Ministry issued a joint statement announcing an increase of 38 percent to 51 percent for gasoline, diesel and kerosene. The policy was later reversed, but the rioting engulfed parts of Pétion-Ville, with 'rioting, looting and fires at the Oasis Hotel' (CNN, 2018) and in other 'Green zone' hotels (Best Western or Marriott), leaving more than 200 expatriates to hide in hotels while insecurity was rampant in the streets.

This 'imagined geography' of insecurity in Port-au-Prince where the 'yellow zone' plays such a prominent role is well captured in a visual representation of the security zones in the Haiti Security Orientation Briefing by the UN Department of Safety and Security in May 2014 (see Fig. 4), where the UN security zones are associated with 'hot areas' of local crime, and illustrated by pictures of what appears like tightly packaged drugs and guns. Interestingly, this visual representation of insecurity was not used in the same briefing of October 2015, with pictures of guns and drugs disappearing from the presentation.

The use of colour coding by MINUSTAH and other international actors creates its own reality on the ground. For Louino Robillard, a community leader in Cité Soleil,

> MINUSTAH didn't create this stigma, but their categorization of it as a 'red zone' was an institutional validation of that stigma. It was a bureaucratic equivalent of the physical concrete barriers they erected around the entrances to Cité Soleil during the wars of 2004–2006.[34]

For another community leader in Cité Soleil, Daniel Tillias, 'one of the consequences of the red zone label is that people see themselves as red'.[35] As Richard Morse, owner of the Oloffson Hotel, further suggests, the security zones are more than physical zones, they are also 'imagined geography':

> there's a new kind of RED ZONE. It's the one where some people tell you you're not in the RED ZONE, and the map shows that you're not in the RED ZONE. Yet 'people in the know' tell you, 'Rich, believe me, you're in the RED ZONE'. (Morse, 2010; emphasis original)

This creates (or reinforces) a social reality of (in)security between the so-called 'green zone' and the rest of Port-au-Prince. As a traveller noted in a Trip Advisor review of Le Plaza Hotel, 'we did not expect that there is a lovely hotel like this in the downtown of Port au prince red zone area'.[36] This doesn't affect only expats and tourists: 'people from

[34] Interview by email with Louino Robillard, Community Leader, Cité Soleil, 1 August 2017.
[35] Interview by Skype with Daniel Tillias, Community Leader, Cité Soleil, 10 November 2017.
[36] It should be noted that Le Plaza Hotel is actually located in the yellow zone, not the red zone. https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/ShowUserReviews-g147307-d148133-r268519618-Le_Plaza_Hotel-Port_au_Prince_Ouest_

the diaspora are also nervous about security issues'.[37] This proves the point made by Dodge, Kitchin and Perkins that maps work because they are about selling a particular vision of the world and because people are willing to buy into this vision (2011: xx). Additionally, security mapping in Port-au-Prince is also a good example of the 'recursive proleptic effect' of mapping, or how maps contribute to the construction of spaces that they later seem only to represent (Sparke, 1998, p. 466).

6. 'Greening' strategies: self-help and resilience-building in the face of securitization practices

Being in a red or yellow zone means that expats have to apply strict security regulations when interacting with locals. It can also mean that local communities can only rely on themselves in difficult times. As one Haitian-American realized after the 2010 earthquake: 'we only found out for folks in our community [Carrefour-Feuilles] that it was a red zone because we weren't getting any help' (Herz, 2010).[38] In other cases, security concerns led the UN to airdrop food aid in Léogane, a community not particularly known for being difficult (Laughlin, 2010). In this context, and to take the local community's perspective, the only way out of this situation – at least theoretically – is to change the security situation on the ground and successfully lobby the UN to amend its risk assessment. These logics lead to locally-led 'resilience-building' practices and self-help strategies, aimed at reversing international risk perception. The concept of 'greening' encapsulates communities' efforts to escape the labels of yellow and red zones, vying for the mythical 'green label'.[39]

A good example of 'greening' practices comes from Bel Air, where in 2009 a petition signed by 36,515 citizens (claimed by the organisers to be 60% of the population of the neighbourhood) was presented to the Haitian prime minister, arguably an official who could not do much to modify UN security assessments. 'We want to get out of red to become green,' argued one of the organisers, adding that 'we are ready to welcome investors' (Alphonse, 2009; author's translation). When receiving the petition, the prime minister, Ms. Michèle Pierre-Louis, added that 'green is a powerful symbol. It means that we can go forward.' She thus wanted 'green [to] become the symbol of all districts wishing for Haiti's progress' (Alphonse, 2009; author's translation).

Another example of a focus on security labelling through practices is the area of Carrefour-Feuilles, where one of the listed accomplishments of a recycling project financed by the IBSA Fund (Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum) was directly related to the security colour coding of the area: 'Thanks to pacification initiatives, including this project, Carrefour Feuilles was reclassified in 2009 from a security red zone to a yellow zone'.[40] A further example is in Cité Soleil, where local community groups 'celebrate [d] the decision [of] several members of the International Community to recognize our mutual success by reclassifying Cite Soleil as a "yellow zone"' (*Haiti Libre*, 2012). In the words of their representatives: 'This is a momentous step towards our common vision to see Cite Soleil change from a "red zone", cut off from the rest of Haiti because of security restrictions, to a "green zone" (an example of co-operation, innovation and sustainability for the rest of the country)' (*Haiti Libre, 2012*). The organisers organised a 'grand day of reflection [and] action', inviting people to wear any item of green clothing to affirm their vision of a Cité Soleil 'green zone'. In the words of Louino Robillard, one of the leaders of the movement, 'the movement sent out press releases saying that Cite Soleil was declaring itself to no longer be a red zone, because even if no one else recognized our progress towards peace and interdependence, we would recognize it ourselves'.[41] Even if the neighbourhood has since been reintegrated into the 'red zone' list (or possibly never left it), the goal for residents is still 'to turn it from a red zone to yellow and then green,' as stated by a local NGO leader, Daniel Tillias (Roshan Lall, 2014).[42] According to Tillias, one way to access this new status is through community gardens and other environmental projects in Cité Soleil, making the link with 'greening' all the more relevant and making this bid to become a 'green zone' like Pétion-Ville a 'possible and realistic outcome'.[43]

Beyond the issue of whether or not security regulations can really be modified, the fight to change security perceptions has now escalated to a new level, according to Louino Robillard:

> It is entirely possible that Cite Soleil is still officially or technically a red zone for MINUSTAH. But at this point, I don't think we care that much anymore. With the advent of social media and an internet-literate youth, we have taken the battle to defending [*sic*] our image to a whole new level. We do exchange with other communities, we highlight our artists and athletes, we have the Cite Soleil Peace Prize, we work with journalists and multimedia professionals, we have social media campaigns. Whether or not MINUSTAH changes its designation has less importance to us today than it did 5 years ago …. What we didn't like was the institutional validation of the stigma that being a 'Red zone' brought us, but we are not measuring our progress on MINUSTAH's color chart.[44]

The business owners in the 'yellow zone' I interviewed display a set of very different self-help strategies. For some, there are simply not enough businesses of interest to the internationals to come together and put pressure on the UN, and hence they do not bother trying to change the regulations once they understand that the root causes of this security policy are 'a mix of incompetence and carelessness ['*je m'en foutisme*']'.[45]

7. Conclusion

This article has made a case for connecting critical geography with international relations, especially colour-coding and security mapping with the securitization and intervention literature. These literature are increasingly cross-fertilizing, especially in the field of critical peace and conflict studies, but few are making the additional leap to connect their arguments with the critical cartography literature. This article does that by underscoring the ramifications of *mapping* as a distinct spatial practice of securitization. Through an in-depth case study of the UN security zones in Port-au-Prince, this article underlines the logics of

(*footnote continued*)
Department_Haiti.html.

[37] Interview with Rosalie.

[38] This issue was also raised by Richard Morse, owner of the Oloffson Hotel, adjacent to Carrefour-Feuilles, in a tweet (@RAMHaiti) on 18 January 2010: 'The Oloffson is "RED ZONE" How can the UN help the people of Carrefour Feuille if they are prohibited from coming to the neighbourhood!!' (see also: Democracy Now!, 2010).

[39] Thus reflecting the 'greening' resilience literature, which studies how 'providing spaces for individuals and communities to engage in greening will contribute to a community's ability to adapt and transform in the face of disaster' (Tidball & Krasny, 2014, p. 8).

[40] See: http://tcdc2.undp.org/ibsa/Upload/Project%20profile/haiti.pdf. This reclassification happened in 2008, according to UNDP, which also funded the project (UNDP, 2011, p. 12). The author has contributed to a documentary on this project, highlighting its impact on the security situation: https://vimeo.com/18668506.

[41] Interview with Robillard.

[42] Daniel Tillias repeated this assertion in the BBC World Service 'Outlook' programme on 4 April 2017, saying that he believed the zone was now yellow according to UN regulations, but that local residents vied for green zone status. See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04y3yw8.

[43] Interview with Tillias, 10 November 2017. Interestingly, the interviewee said that the final aim is to rebuild a greener Haiti, similar to what Haiti was like before Christopher Columbus' arrival on its shores.

[44] Interview with Robillard.

[45] Interview with Pierre-Louis.

securitization behind the *security mapping* practices, but also how these practices are linked to the wider Haitian statebuilding process.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this research. First, it appears that securitization practices in Haiti reflect an imagined geography of the capital city, which has little to do with actual shifting patterns of risks to international expatriates. There are multiple explanations for this, but one local hotel owner volunteered an additional, more cynical one: 'UN staffers will start a revolution if you tell them that they can't party in Pétion-Ville any more'.[46] When discussing the construction of insecurity by international actors, other alternative explanations may require further examination, especially the one that says that security regulations are kept as they are despite the changing security landscape in order to justify the lucrative bonuses that expat personnel earn when posted to difficult areas (Pettinger, 2013, p. 190).[47] Some of these are quite practical: 'there is nothing for us there,' as one interviewee pointed out when trying to explain why the 'yellow zone' had not been modified over the years. When confronted with crime figures for Pétion-Ville, MINUSTAH officials interviewed for the purpose of this article suggested that this helped explain why the UN police had such a presence in this area, providing an *ex post* justification for the international presence in the district. Interestingly, the current UN mission (MINUJUSTH) aims to revisit the boundaries of the security zones, effectively 'shrinking the yellow zone' in order to avoid 'restricting the movement of people unduly.'[48] This position is taken on the basis of a different reading of insecurity in the country. As MINUJUSTH's Chief Security Adviser asserts: 'The country needs a new security risk assessment. It is not a high-risk country. There is no terrorism, no conflict in Haiti. You have crime and civil unrest, but not unlike many countries … All in all, it is a low-risk duty station.' He adds that 'we are talking about protests, not riots. Demonstrations are not real areas of concern; there is simply a need to brief staff to avoid these areas.'[49] This led the Chief Security Adviser to question the current policies in interesting ways. For instance, the UN mission will review why it is more peaceful in the 'yellow zone', aiming to understand if it is inherently more secure or simply correlated with the fact that the UN is not present there.

A second finding that emerges from this research is that securitization strategies as displayed under MINUSTAH are embedded within wider logics of social segregation in Haiti – hence becoming an integral part of statebuilding and nation-building processes (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). The story of Haiti has been one of a clear distinction between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', marked by economic, political, racial, and linguistic divisions. The international intervention plays into these divisions, influencing in its own way the socio-political geography of Port-au-Prince by directing investments towards the already most affluent part of the city. Moreover, neighbourhoods are 'lived spaces'; most international actors will operate in districts they are already implanted in and where they know the configurations – in other words, 'neighbourhoods of intervention' (Lombart, Pierrat, & Redon, 2014, p. 110). The distancing from and growing estrangement with whole sections of the urban landscape has inevitable ramifications for development work.

A third and final finding is that local actors are not passive participants in the face of these securitization strategies. Even if they cannot effectively pressure an actor such as the UN to change its security regulations, local actors have displayed a mix of tactics, mostly driven by self-help and resilience-building strategies. This is consistent with research on the study of security and the everyday, analysing the constant (re-)negotiation of practices and discourses of insecurity on the ground. This article demonstrated how security mapping and its underlying logics are to a certain extent reappropriated by local actors as part of a wider battle to retake control and ownership of the narratives produced on Port-au-Prince and Haiti. The article suggested the concept of 'greening' to capture this willingness to shift colour encoding of security zones from 'red' and 'yellow' to the 'green' status (along with the advantages the status procures).

Other implications of this research would merit further attention. One implication of securitization practices not discussed in this article is the physical and social separation between international staff and national field staff and the stark difference in their relative exposure to risk and access to protection and other benefits (Collinson & Duffield, 2013, p. v; Dandoy, 2013, p. 6; Egeland et al., 2011, pp. 40–41). As argued in this article, security mapping is first and foremost for expatriate consumption, and hence security protocols do not formally apply to national field staff. This could mean that local staff will unduly be relied upon when the time comes to conduct a project or hold a meeting in a yellow or red zone. Alternatively, national field staff can also serve as a bridge between an increasingly isolated expat community socialized within the most privileged and affluent sector of Port-au-Prince and the rest of the population living in the wider metropolitan area. This, in turn, raises the issue that the securitization practices at play in Haiti also cast doubt on the ability of peacekeepers (or other international workers) to build effective relationships with the local population.[50] Having to drive with windows up and doors locked through most of the capital will undoubtedly affect one's capacity to interact positively with the local population and gain its trust.

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[46] Interview with Pierre-Louis.

[47] This interpretation is discussed and offered by many interviewees.

[48] Interview with Monjimbo.

[49] UNDP, 2011.

[50] For a similar argument on how militaries display ever less interaction with local populations, see Lyall & Wilson, 2009.

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